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Comment

Binary Imprisonment: Transgender Inmates
Ensnared within the System and Confined to
Assigned Gendert

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is June 26, 2015. The sun is shining, and the grass is wet with
morning dew. Those unaware sip their coffee on the way to work,
perplexed why so many rainbow flags clutter their morning commute.
Celebrations are breaking out across the Nation. The United States
Supreme Court has legalized same-sex marriage.' Finally, the day has
come when people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender
(LGBTQ) are given the same rights as their heterosexual brothers and
sisters. If only there was any truth to such idealism. To the contrary,

t. I would like to thank Professor McMurtry-Chubb and my Critical Race
Theory/Critical Race Feninism classmates for their insightful comments, conversations, and
support. I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to Ashley Diamond, whose
bravery inspired this Comment.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding that under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples
have a fundamental right to marry).
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there are still debilitating injustices against members of the LGBTQ
community that must be acknowledged and rectified.
The same day the Supreme Court reaches its seminal decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges,2 Ashley Diamond, an African-American, transgender woman, sits afraid and alone in a Georgia prison. Once again, Ms.
Diamond is being tormented, threatened, and terrorized by her fellow
inmates. Tormented, threatened, and terrorized all because Ms. Diamond
had the courage to report that she had been sexually assaulted. While
incarcerated, she has been repeatedly sexually abused, raped, and
exploited.'
Flash forward to August 4, 2015. Prison officials place Ms. Diamond
in solitary confinement for her own protection." While the confinement
may momentarily give her refuge from physical attacks, it cannot protect
Ms. Diamond from herself. She suffers from post-traumatic stress
disorder, stemming from repeated sexual and verbal attacks, as well as
the mental and physical manifestations of gender dysphoria." She
states:
I am locked down in a solitary cell for 24 hours a day, without access
to light, exercise, or running water. Twenty-four hours a day I battle
a debilitating and agonizing desire to end my life, because being forced
to change my gender and live as male makes me feel like I am already
dead.'
This Comment examines the oppressive and discriminatory treatment
of transgender inmates within the criminal justice system. Part II
provides a background on societal and medical conceptions of transgender women and men. In particular, it discusses how pervasive discrimination coerces transgender women and men into incarceration, addresses
the highly debated classification of gender dysphoria as a mental illness,
and introduces the prevailing medical standards of care for inmates with

2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. Joint Status Report at 1, Diamond v. Owens, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189 (M.D.
Ga. July 09, 2015) (No. 5:15-CV-50), availableat https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/
files/d6_1egacy fles/downloads/case/joint-status-report-_150709.pdf.
4. TransgenderInmate Ashley Diamond Released from Georgia Prison after Pressure
from SPLC Lawsuit, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2015), https//www.splcenter.org/news/
2015/08/31/transgender-inmate-ashley-diamond-released-georgia-prison-after-pressure-splclawsuit.
5. Mental Health Progress Note at 1, Diamond, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189 (M.D.
Ga. May 18, 2015) (No. 5:15-CV-50), ECF No. 49-14 at 2, availableat https://www.splcente
r.org/sites/default/files/d6-legacyfiles/downloads/case/cezie-declarationandexhibits part2
.pdf; see also Gender Dysphoria, in AM. PSYHCIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-51.
6. TransgenderInmate Ashley Diamond Released from Georgia Prison, supra note 4.
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gender dysphoria. Part III of this Comment presents how most
transgender inmates seek redress for constitutional violations. Part IV
analyzes the constitutional dimensions of Eighth Amendment' claims
for the failure to provide medically necessary care. Part V scrutinizes the
dangerous conditions of confinement in which transgender inmates are
exposed and the Prison Rape Elimination Act.' Finally, Part VI
concludes by providing alternative policy suggestions and legal
arguments to ensure the protection and treatment of transgender
inmates.
II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Defining "'Dansgender"
The entire world noticed when Olympic Athlete Caitlyn Jenner
glamorously debuted her transition on the cover of Vanity Fair.? Public
opinion ranged on all parts of the spectrum-from pride and acceptance,
to hatred and disgust.'o The majority of the public's reaction on social
media comments, Facebook posts, and Tweets, although different, had
one common thread-ignorance. Ignorance could be too harsh a word for
some, but it is most certainly deserving for others. Most people have a
preconceived notion of what it means to be transgender. However, such
pre-conceptualized notions ostracize and marginalize transgender
persons within society and, thus, within the law."

A.

7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2012).
9. Ravi Somaiya, Caitlyn Jenner,Formerly Bruce, IntroducesHerself, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 2015, at B1.
10. Elinor Burkett, Opinion, What Makes a Woman?, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2015, at SR
1; Allison H. Steinberg, Letter to the Editor, Jenner and Gender, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2015, at SR 10.
11. For example, on January 15, 2014, an ESPN-owned website, Grantland,published
an article that purported to be an expos4 on an innovative golf putter invented by Dr.
Essay Anne Vanderbilt. Caleb Hannan, Dr. V's MagicalPutter, GRANTLAND (Jan. 15, 2014),
while
However,
http://grantland.com/features/a-mysterious-physicist-golf-club-dr-v/.
investigating Dr. Vanderbilt, journalist Caleb Hannan wrongfully outted her as a
transgender woman. Id. Hannan did not stop there-he attacked her credibility and
divulged Dr. Vanderbilt's personal history prior to her transition, including her birth name,
past relationships, and even past lawsuits. Id. When he found out Dr. Vanderbilt was
transgender, he reported that "a chill actually ran up [his] spine." Id. He characterized the
article as such: "What began as a story about a brilliant woman with a new invention had
turned into the tale of a troubled man who had invented a new life for himself." Id. During
the eight months that Hannan was reporting and verbally berating Dr. Vanderbilt, her
friends, and family-Dr. Vanderbilt committed suicide. Id.
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The American Psychological Association defines "transgender" as a
catch-all term used "for persons whose gender identity, gender expression, or behavior does not conform to that typically associated with the
sex to which they were assigned at birth." 2 Gender expression is how
people outwardly manifest or communicate their gender identity to
others." This can be through clothing, behavior, mannerisms, or
voice." Although people often create an ambiguous exchange of the
terms "gender identity" and "sexual orientation," the two are not
interlinked. Specifically, gender identity "refers to an individual's
identification as male, female, or, occasionally, some category other than
male or female.""
On the other hand, sexual orientation refers to an immutable
emotional, romantic, or physical attraction to another person.' 6
Accordingly, just like cisgender" women and men, transgender women
and men may be androphilic,'8 gynephilic," bisexual, or asexual.2 0
Cisgender is an adjective that refers to people who fit within the natal
gender binary; in other words, people are cisgender if their gender
identity corresponds with the gender to which they are assigned at
birth. 2' The term cisgender is preferable to the more frequently used
term "gender-normative" because it strays away from essentialist ideals
designating some gender identities as "normal" and others "abnormal."
This anti-essentialism nomenclature reinforces the fact that there is no
normal gender-one is either cisgender or transgender.

12. Answers to Your QuestionsAbout TransgenderPeople, Gender Identity, and Gender
Expression, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N 1(2011), availableat http://www.apa.org/topics/1gbt/
transgender.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See DSM-5, supra note 5.
16. Answers to Your Questions, supra note 12, at 2.
17. Cisgender, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/de
finitionamericanenglish/cisgender (last visited Dec. 16, 2015).
18. Androphilic is defined as being "[a]ttracted to males, men, and/or masculinity."
Safezone, Terminology, W. OR. UNIv., httpl//www.wou.edu/wp/safezone/files/2014/06/LB
GTQ-Terminology.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
19. Gynephilic is defined as being "[a]ttracted to females, women, and/or femininity."
See Safezone, supra note 18.
20. Answers to Your Questions, supra note 12, at 2.
21. Cisgender, supra note 17; Katy Steinmetz, This Is What 'Cisgender'Means, TIME
(Dec. 2014), http://time.com/3636430/cisgender-definition/; see also Safezone, supra note 18
("A term meaning 'not transgender,' that is, having a gender identity or performing in a
gender role that society considers appropriate for one's sex.").
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B. Society's PervasiveDiscriminationCoerces TransgenderWomen
and Men into Incarceration
Ashley Diamond, the African-American, transgender woman referenced above, was a mere fifteen years old when she was kicked out of
her childhood home for being transgender.2 2 Afterwards, she struggled
to find an employer who was willing to hire a trans teenager. In a recent
NPR interview, Ms. Diamond ruminated on discrimination she faced
while applying for a job at McDonald's: "When they asked me for my
Social Security card and my ID, she looked down at it and said, 'Oh this
must be a mistake.'" 2 3 Ms. Diamond assured the McDonald's employee
that there was no mistake, to which the woman replied, "'Oh, I'm
absolutely sorry. We don't do that here.' She said 'That. Here.'"24 Ms.
Diamond's arduous job search continued but was persistently plagued by
rejection after rejection. As a last resort, she began stealing to survive.
Consequently, she was arrested multiple times on theft and burglary
charges.25
In 2011, Ms. Diamond was sentenced to an eleven year term of
imprisonment. 26 She explained to NPR that she accepts full responsibility for her crimes, stating: "I'm very sorry for the people I've hurt," and
that she only began stealing because she "needed the money to
survive."27 Ms. Diamond's story is just one example of transgender
women and men struggling to survive in today's gender-binary driven
society.
In 2008, the National Center for Transgender Equality and the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force conducted a study focusing on the
discrimination that transgender and gender-nonconforming people are
confronted with in every facet of life-housing, education, employment,
healthcare, and the criminal justice system. The organizations published
their findings in the 2011 National Transgender Discrimination
Survey.28 The survey revealed the overwhelming impact that anti-

22. Lisa Hagen, TransgenderParoleeAshley DiamondFaces UncertainFuture, WABE
(Sept. 11, 2015), http-//news.wabe.org/postitransgender-parolee-ashley-diamond-facesuncertain-future.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Find an Offender, GA. DEP'T OF CORRS., http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/GDC/OffenderQuery/jsp/OffQryRedirector.jsp (last visited Dec. 17, 2015); see also Hagen, supra note 22.
27. Hagen, supra note 22.
28. Jamie Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender
DiscriminationSurvey, NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., at 2-3 (2011), available at
http://endtransdiscrimination.org/PDFs/NTDSReport.pdf.
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transgender bias and stigma has on transgender persons across the
nation.29 Sixty-three percent of the transgender and gender-nonconforming participants reported they had suffered a serious act of
discrimination-acts that have a grave impact on one's quality of life,
physical and emotional stability, and capacity to financially support
themselves." The discriminatory events included, but are not limited
to, the following: lost job due to bias; eviction due to bias; sexual assault
due to bias; homelessness because of gender identity and expression;
denial of medical care due to bias; and lastly, incarceration due to
gender identity and expression.'
Many legal theorists use intersectionality as a tool to effectively
analyze and address human rights violations. 2 Intersectionality is "the
examination of race, sex, class, national origin, and sexual orientation"
and how specific identities overlap to make certain persons more
Intersectionality serves as a guide to
vulnerable to discrimination.
move away from a single, essentialist focus-for example, gender-only or
approaches-which instead
anti-essentialist
race-only-towards
individualize the analysis.' Accordingly, one of the most important
findings of the National Transgender Discrimination Survey was "the
combination of anti-transgender bias and persistent, structural and
individual[ized] racism [which] was especially devastating for Black
transgender people and other people of color.""
First, while transgender people of all races were nearly four times
more likely than the general population to earn an annual income of less

29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 1-8; see also Kristen Clements-Nolle et al., Attempted Suicide Among
TransgenderPersons:The Influence of Gender-basedDiscriminationand Victimization, 51
J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53 (2006); Kristen Clements et al., The TransgenderCommunity Health
Project:DescriptiveResults, UCSF: HIVINSITE (1999), http/hivinsite.ucsf.edu/insite?page
=cftg-02-02; Emilia L. Lombardi et al., Gender Violence: Transgender Experiences with
Violence and Discrimination,42 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 89 (2001); Report of the APA Task
Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, 39-44 (2009),
https://www.apa.org/piAgbt/resources/policy/gender-identity-report.pdf- Jessica Xavier, A
Needs Assessment of TransgenderedPeople of Color Living in Washington, DC, 8 INT'L J.
TRANSGENDERISM 31 (2005).
32. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed.
Press 2003).
33. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
57-58 (2d ed. 2012).
34. Id. at 62-65.
35. Injustice at Every Turn:A Look at Black Respondents in the National Transgender
DiscriminationSurvey, Nat'l Ctr. for Transgender Equal., NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK
FORCE & NAT'L BLACK JUSTICE COALITION (2011), http://endtransdiscrimination.org/PDFs/
BlackTransFactsheetFINAL_090811.pdf; see Grant et al., supra note 28, at 2.
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than $10,000, Black transgender individuals were eight times more
likely.36 Second, a startling forty-one percent of Black and thirty-three
percent ofAmerican Indian persons experienced homelessness, compared
to fourteen percent of White respondents. 7 Third, exactly twenty-three
percent of Latino/a and twenty-one percent of Black transgender people
were refused medical care due to anti-transgender bias, in contrast to
nineteen percent overall." One of the respondents stated:
Denial of health care by doctors is the most pressing problem for me.
Finding doctors that will treat, will prescribe, and will even look at you
like a human being rather than a thing has been problematic. [I] [hlave
been denied care by doctors and major hospitals so much that I now
use only urgent care physician assistants, and I never reveal my
gender history."
The survey's overwhelming correlation between transgender persons
who experienced disparaging life events and transgender persons who
have been incarcerated cannot be overlooked. This correlation was also
remarkably present with transgender persons of color. While seven
percent of the overall respondents stated they were incarcerated solely
because of their gender identity and expression, the rate dramatically
increased for Black respondents (forty-one percent) and Hispanic
respondents (twenty-one percent).40 Additionally, those who reported
they were physically assaulted at school due to bias had a fifty percent
likelihood of being incarcerated.' Next, the participants that were
unemployed or lost a job due to their gender identity were eighty-five
percent more likely to be incarcerated than the participants who were
employed.42 Lastly, homelessness was also tied to incarceration, making
respondents two and a half times more likely to be incarcerated than
transgender persons who had not experienced homelessness. In fact,

36. Grant et al., supra note 28, at 2, 22, 33, 51, 56, 70; Injustice at Every Turn:A Look
at Black Respondents in the National TransgenderDiscriminationSurvey, supra note 35.
37. Grant et al., supra note 28, at 112; Injustice at Every Turn: A Look at Black
Respondents in the National TransgenderDiscriminationSurvey, supra note 35.
38. Grant et al., supra note 28, at 6, 72; Injustice at Every Turn: A Look at Black
Respondents in the NationalTransgenderDiscriminationSurvey, supra note 35, at 3; Jack
Harrison-Quintana, David P6rez & Jaime Grant, Injustice at Every Turn: A Look at
Latino/a Respondents in the National TransgenderDiscriminationSurvey 3, NAT'L CTR.
FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., NATL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, & LEAGUE OF UNITED
LATIN AM. CITIZENS (2011), http/www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/

ntdslatinoenglish_2.pdf.
39. Grant et al., supra note 28, at 75.
40. Id. at 163.
41.
42.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 66. 67.
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approximately half of all currently homeless respondents reported they
had been previously incarcerated.?
Consequently, the National Transgender Discrimination Survey
evidences that the institutions of patriarchy and capitalism isolate
transgender people from being able to fully participate in society. This
exclusion provides a direct path into the criminal justice system for
many trans people, especially trans people of color.
C.

Gender Dysphoria:Mental Illness or Means of Marginalization?

Gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition recognized in both the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)" and
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10).4 The ICD-10 uses
the diagnostic term "transsexualism," which is interchangeable with the
term gender dysphoria." It defines transsexualism as "[a] desire to live
and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually accompanied
by a sense of discomfort with, or inappropriateness of, one's anatomic
sex, and a wish to have surgery and hormonal treatment to make one's
body as congruent as possible with one's preferred sex."47
According to the DSM-5, people can be diagnosed with "gender dysphoria" if they experience prolonged, significant discomfort or distress from
the incongruence between their assigned and expressed gender.' The
DSM-5 requires that the individual experience gender incongruence for
a minimum of six months. In addition to the duration, the individual
must manifest at least two of the following criteria before being
diagnosed:
A marked incongruence between one's experienced/expressed gender
and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the anticipated secondary sex characteristics)[;]I.A strong desire
to be rid of one's primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because
of a marked incongruence with one's experienced/expressed gender (or
in young adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of the
anticipated secondary sex characteristics)[;]II.A strong desire for the
primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other gender[;]III.A
strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender

43.
44.

Id. at 106, 119.
DSM-5, supra note 5, at 451-53.

45. INT'L CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES (10th Revision), at F64.0, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(2016), http//apps.who.inticlassifeations/icdl0/browse/2016/ea#/F64.9 [hereinafter ICD-101.

46.

See, e.g., DSM-5, supra note 5, at 451-53; ICD-10, supra note 45.

47.
48.
49.

ICD-10, supra note 45.
DSM-5, supra note 5, at 452.
Id. at 451-53; see ICD-10, supra note 45.
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different from one's assigned gender)[;]IVA strong desire to be treated
as the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one's
assigned gender)[;]V.A strong conviction that one has the typical
feelings and reactions of the other gender (or some alternative gender
different from one's assigned gender)."o
It is important to note that not all transgender persons experience

gender dysphoria." Gender dysphoria replaced the diagnostic nomenclature "gender identity disorder," which was previously used in DSMIV.5 2 The new term was introduced to establish that gender nonconformity is not a mental disorder per se." Notwithstanding the change in
terminology, many scholars and health care professionals contend that
the gender dysphoria diagnosis should be removed from the DSM
because it inappositely pathologizes the distress associated with gender
noncongruence." There may be merit in that argument seeing as
homosexuality was also once pathologized in the DSM, only to be

replaced by "ego-dystonic homosexuality" in DSM-III. 5
The term dystonic references "the subjective experience of unhappiness
and is contrasted with syntonic behavior, or one's comfort with their
same-sex desires."5 6 Ego-dystonic homosexuality was not removed from

the DSM until 1980. Although eliminated, it is arguable that thirtythree years later its diagnostic progeny takes form in the DSM-5 as
gender dysphoria. In other words, the depathologization of gender
identity disorder can be viewed as a similar corollary to the slow
depathologization of homosexuality. The preposterousness of the
inclusion of gender dysphoria as a diagnosis can be best understood by
prominent psychiatrist and lawyer, Dr. Richard Green's sarcastic
comment, "On that fateful day in 1973 [when homosexuality was
removed from the DSM], in America alone, several million mentally ill
persons were cured.""
That said, advocates for the depathologization of gender variance
recognize the paradoxical situation in which its removal may very well

50. DSM-5, supra note 5, at 452.
51. Eli Coleman et al., Standardsof Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender,
and Gender-NonconformingPeople, World Professional Association for Transgender Health,
13 INT'L J. TRANSGENDERISM 168-69 (7th ed. 2011).
52. Alrene Istar Lev, GenderDysphoria:Two Steps Forward,One Step Back, CLIN. SOC.
WORK J. (2013); see also Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 169.
53. Lev, supra note 52; see also Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 169.
54. Lev, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (alteration in original).
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create. The Worict Professionai Association for Transgenaer Health
states.
[T]ranssexual, transgender, and gender-nonconforming individuals are
not inherently disordered. Rather, the distress of gender dysphoria,
when present, is the concern that might be diagnosable and for which
various treatment options are available. The existence of a diagnosis
for such dysphoria often facilitates access to health care and can guide
further research into effective treatments."

That is where the crux of the issue lies-the very prejudice that sparked
the inclusion of gender dysphoria in the DSM also prevents its exclusion.
As of now, the pathologization of gender dysphoria creates access to
health care and treatment for transgender inmates.59 "We cannot
minimize the power of diagnoses in the civil rights struggles of sexual
and gender minorities."' However, if the diagnosis was removed,
societal stigma affixed to gender nonconformity may very well decrease
or eliminate the access to proper medical care.
D. PrevailingMedical Standards of Care for Inmates with Gender
Dysphoria
In 2011, the World Professional Association for Transgender Health
(WPATH), published the Standards of Care for the Health of ranssexual, Ransgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People, Version 7
(Standards of Care)."' The American Medical Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association
recognize WPATH's Standards of Care as the medically accepted
guidelines for treatment of gender dysphoria. 2 The Standards of Care
apply to all transgender individuals, regardless of whether they are

58.

Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 169.

59. Lev, supra note 52.
60. Id.
61. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 169.
62. Am. Medical Ass'n House of Delegates, Res. 122 (A-08) (2008) (WPATH "is the
leading international, interdisciplinary professional organization devoted to the
understanding and treatment of gender identity disorders, and has established
internationally accepted Standards of Care for providing medical treatment for people with
[gender dysphoria]" (footnote omitted)); see 7 FAM 1300 Appendix M: Gender Change, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 10, 2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organi
zation/143160.pdf; Report of the APA Task Force on GenderIdentity and Gender Variance,
supra note 31, at 20, 32-33; see also Report of the APA Task Force on Treatment of Gender
Identity Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N 8 (2011) ("mo date no professional organization
of mental health practitioners [including the APA] provides [gender identity disorder
treatment] recommendations.").
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jailed or imprisoned.6 3 Transgender inmates must be afforded the same
or substantially similar medical treatment available to them prior to
incarceration."
There are various therapeutic options available for persons suffering
from gender dysphoria, including: changes in gender expression and role,
body modifications, hormone therapy, surgery, or psychotherapy. It is
imperative that treatment is individualized to fit each person's needs.
Treatment that alleviates one individual's gender dysphoria can be
completely different from what helps another." Along with individualization, it is equally vital that physicians, counselors, and medical
personnel are proficiently trained to treat persons with gender dysphoria.6
However, all too often, health care providers lack the expertise and
cultural competence to adequately address all the needs of a transgender
patient. 67 Numerous persons afflicted with gender dysphoria also suffer
from other mental health concerns, which may be related to gender
dysphoria itself, chronic minority stress, or both.6 ' Accordingly, treating
mental health professionals must screen for the following potential
conditions: "anxiety, depression, self-harm, a history of abuse and
neglect, compulsivity, substance abuse, sexual concerns, personality
disorders, eating disorders, psychotic disorders, and autistic spectrum
disorders.""
After a proper psychological assessment has been performed, hormone
therapy may be used to treat an individual's gender dysphoria if the
following criteria are met:

,

1. Persistent, well-documented gender dysphoria;
2. Capacity to make a fully informed decision and to consent for
treatment;
3. Age of majority in a given country ...
4. If significant medical or mental health concerns are present, they
must be reasonably well-controlled.70

63. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 206.
64. Id.; Report of the APA Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance, supra
note 31, at 42.
65. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 170-71.
66. See id. at 179.
67. Grant et al., supra note 28, at 72, 76 (finding that 50% of all respondents "reported
having to teach their medical providers about transgender care").
68. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 180-81.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 187.
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Although hormone therapy generally should not be initiated if an
individual has uncontrolled significant medical or mental concerns, the
lack of hormone therapy or abrupt withdrawal of hormones when
medically necessary has debilitating consequences, ranging from
depression, dysphoria, autocastration, and suicide.7 ' The loss of
autonomy over treatment, can force transgender women to surgically
self-treat through autocastration.7 2
The American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric
Association, and WPATH insist that transgender inmates have access to
transition-related healthcare.7 3 It is necessary to seek outside consultation if the institution does not have a qualified health professional on
staff to assess and treat inmates with gender dysphoria. It is vital that
inmates continue hormone therapy while incarcerated. It is equally
important that inmates diagnosed with gender dysphoria start treatment
immediately. If the inmate meets the above four qualifications, hormone
therapy should be initiated.7 4
III.

TITLE 42 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1983 AND THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

Transgender inmates most commonly bring what are known as section
1983 claims. Title 42 of the United States Code, section 198376 does
not grant inmates substantive rights; to the contrary it serves as a tool
for inmates to bring claims against state actors who violate the

71. Id. at 207.
72. Id.
73. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 206; Report of the APA Task Force on Gender
Identity and Gender Variance, supra note 31, at 42; Report of the APA Task Force on
Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder, supra note 62, at 30.
74. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 207.
75. JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., 3-11 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 1 11.01
(2015).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The statute reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
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Constitution and federal law." The corollary to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims, known as "Bivens actions," may be brought against federal prison
officials directly under the United States Constitution." Unlike habeas
corpus claims, constitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions
of incarceration may be brought in the first instance.
Generally, injunctive relief is available as a remedy for unconstitutional prison conditions.so Inmates may attempt to seek preliminary relief,
but courts will not enjoin prison officials absent a showing that: (1) the
inmate "is likely to succeed on the merits"; (2) the inmate is likely to
suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief; (3) the threatened
injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause
the prison; and (4) the "injunction is in the public interest".8 ' The
United States Supreme Court has described a preliminary injunction as
"an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. 8 2 Thus, an
inmate's request for permanent injunctive relief often becomes moot once
the inmate is released or transferred to another institution.8 3
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)8 4 seeks to eliminate
gratuitous federal interference with state administration of prisons and,
thus, attempts to give prison officials time to address complaints
internally before allowing the initiation of a federal lawsuit.' In
accord, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is required for all
prisoner suits seeking redress for prison conditions under § 1983,
irrespective of whether they involve general conditions or specific events
and whether they allege an Eighth Amendment violation."
Section 1997e(a) of Title 4287 provides, "No action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section [1983 of this title] by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.""
Further, it is crucial to note that the PLRA restricts prisoners' claims in

77. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1979).
78. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643
(2004).
80. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993).
81. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
82. Id. at 24.
83. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 35-36.
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (2012).
85. Id.; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84-85 (2006).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
88. Id.
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federal court "for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual
act . . . ."" Consequently, transgender inmates suffering from gender
dysphoria are severely limited from bringing a § 1983 claim if there is
no physical manifestation of their gender incongruence.o
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: FACETS OF
EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS

The United States Constitution does not command penal institutions
be comfortable, but it does prohibit inhumane conditions." The Eighth
Amendment proscribes the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
on prisoners.92 It is well settled that the treatment a prisoner receives
while incarcerated and the conditions he is forced to endure are subject
to Eighth Amendment scrutiny." Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment
obligates prison officials to provide humane conditionsof confinement.94
In particular, officials have an affirmative duty to supply all inmates
with "adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care."" Officials
must also take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of all inmates."
A transgender inmate, consequently, has a right under the Eighth
Amendment to be safeguarded against obvious dangers while incarcerated.97
Whether a particular incident or condition constitutes "cruel and
unusual punishment" is drawn from "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."" Harsh and restrictive
conditions are not necessarily violative, rather those conditions are the
very nature of penalization for the commission of criminal offenses. 9
However, modem standards of decency are always violated when

89. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012).
90. Esinam Agbemenu, Medical Transgressions in America's Prisons: Defending
TransgenderPrisoners'Accessto Transition-RelatedCare, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2627, 29 (2015).
91. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
349 (1981).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
93. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 840-44.
98. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).
99. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
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punishment involves the unnecessary and malicious infliction of
pain." Such punishment lacks a penological objective or justification,
and therefore, violates the Eighth Amendment.' 0 1 For example,
allowing an inmate to be beaten or raped by another prisoner has no
penological justification and frankly is not "part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." 0 2
The Supreme Court has devised a two-prong standard to establish a
claim under the Eighth Amendment. 03 First, a prisoner must objectively prove that she was deprived of a basic human need that was
"sufficiently serious."' Second, a prisoner must show the official acted
with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," meaning the official was
deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety.o' This prong
is subjective and, therefore, requires the prisoner to prove the official
knew there was a substantial risk of harm but chose to disregard the
risk. 06
A.

Constitutional Right to Necessary Medical Care

As noted above, the Eighth Amendment requires penal institutions to
provide its inmates with adequate medical care. In Estelle v. Gamble,' the Supreme Court limited recovery under the Eighth Amendment. 0 ' A prisoner can only recover if she can establish (1) that she
has an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that the penal institution acted with "deliberate indifference to [her] serious medical
needs."1o' Mere medical negligence is insufficient to state a valid claim
under the Eighth Amendment."o Rather, deliberate indifference lies
somewhere on the continuum between negligent conduct and conduct
engaged in "for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that
harm will result.""' Each prong is discussed in detail below.

100. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 9 (noting that "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are
violated").
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.
102. Farmer,511 U.S. at 833 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 347).
103. Id. at 834.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 837.
107. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
108. Id. at 104-05.
109. Id. at 104.
110. Id. at 106.
111. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
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1. Objective Prong: What Constitutes a "Serious Medical
Need?" First, an objectively serious medical need is "one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor's attention.""1 2 To establish the objective prong, the transgender inmate must show (1) that a reasonable doctor or patient would
perceive gender dysphoria as "important and worthy of comment or
treatment," (2) that gender dysphoria significantly affects the inmate's
daily activities, and (3) whether "chronic and substantial pain"
exists.
Courts have yet to universally find that gender dysphoria is always a
serious medical need. Instead, the gravity of an inmate's gender
dysphoria is evaluated on a case by case basis, which is somewhat
counterintuitive seeing as it is modeled to be ,an objective standard. This
likely is due to the WPATH Standards of Care, which provides that
treatment for gender dysphoria varies based on the needs of each
individual.' 14
WPATH Board of Directors member Dr. Randi Ettner has presented
expert medical testimony on behalf of gender dysphoric plaintiffs in
several notable cases within the First, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits."' She describes the varying degrees to which
gender dysphoria manifests itself: "For some people the disorder is so
intense and so severe . . . they simply cannot function unless they do
something to correct this disorder. For other people the discomfort is less
intense, and they are able to manage the condition over a lifetime."116
Accordingly, what treatment is considered "medically necessary"
generally depends on the specific individual." 7

112. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gutierrez v.
Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)); Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)).
113. Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 898 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (quoting Gutierrez,
111 F.3d at 1373); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that "chronic and substantial pain" is an example of a serious and medical need).
114. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 168.
115. See, e.g., Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2014); G.G. v.
Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15cv54, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124905 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17,
2015); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Konitzer, 711 F. Supp.
2d 874; Adams v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 716 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Mass. 2010); Fields v.
Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Wis. 2010); Sunstrom v. Frank, 630 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D.
Wis. 2007); Declaration of Dr. Randi Ettner, Diamond, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189 (M.D.
Ga. May 18, 2015) (No. 5:15-CV-50), ECF No. 49-2.
116. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42 (quoting Dr. Ettner's testimony).
117. See Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 168.
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In particular, six of the United States Courts of Appeals have
previously found gender dysphoria to be a serious medical need using
Eighth Amendment analysis.' Three Courts of Appeals have considered the issue, but found it needless to hold whether gender dysphoria
constitutes a serious medical need."' However, in Farmer v. Brennan 2 0 the Supreme Court treated transsexualism as a serious medical
condition, based on its listing in the DSM and the American Medical
Association's Encyclopedia of Medicine.' 2 1
Moreover, court analyses of gender dysphoria, more often than not,
focus on the physical manifestations of the condition rather than its
psychological effects.' 22 Such reasoning may be a result of transphobic
bias or a reaction to the PLRA's restriction discussed in Part II, in which
the PLRA precludes prisoners' claims in federal court "for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury."'2 3 For example, in DeLonta v. Angelone (DeLonta
1)124 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's propensity to self-mutilate because of her gender
dysphoria was an objectively serious need, rather than the gender
dysphoria itself. 2 5 There are some serious logical fallacies in such a
rationale, and generally speaking, it is caused by a lack of knowledge.
In DeLonta v. Johnson (DeLonta II),126 the Fourth Circuit again
discussed the plaintiff's serious medical need concerning her selfmutilation. After prevailing in the first lawsuit, the plaintiff was entitled
to transition-related care. The plaintiff underwent a year of counseling,
hormone treatment, and lived as a woman. However, such treatment did
not alleviate her gender dysphoria, causing her to attempt self-castra-

118. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014); Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d
449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011); Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App'x 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001); Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000); Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F. Supp.
792, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affd, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10204, at *1-2 (6th Cir. May 10,
1991); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821
F.2d 408, 411-13 (7th Cir. 1987); see also O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r, 134 T.C. 34, 63 (2010).
119. Praylor v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 2005),
withdrawing 423 F.3d 524, 525-26 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that transsexualism constitutes
a serious medical need for Eighth Amendment purposes); Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d
610, 614-15 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kothmann, 558 F. App'x at 910 n.4.
120. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
121. Id. at 829.
122. Agbemenu, supra note 90, at 17.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
124. 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter De'Lonta I].
125. Id. at 634; see also De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013)
[hereinafter De'Lonta ll].
126. 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013).
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tion. When further therapeutic options of sexual reassignment surgery
were denied, she brought another § 1983 action.' 27 In discussing her
sufficient allegations, the court made the following analogy:
[Ilmagine that prison officials prescribe a painkiller to an inmate who
has suffered a serious injury from a fall, but that the inmate's symptoms, despite the medication, persist to the point that he now, by all
objective measure, requires evaluation for surgery. Would prison
officials then be free to deny him consideration for surgery, immunized
from constitutional suit by the fact they were giving him a painkiller?
We think not. Accordingly, although ... a prisoner does not enjoy a
constitutional right to the treatment of his or her choice, the treatment
a prison facility does provide must nevertheless be adequate to address
the prisoner's serious medical need.'
What is so striking about the analogy the court posed is that it in fact
negates its finding that the plaintiff's self-mutilation was a serious
medical need opposed to the gender dysphoria. Self-mutilation is just a
possible symptom of gender dysphoria, just as pain is a symptom of
falling. In other words, courts that refuse to acknowledge gender
dysphoria as a serious medical need regularly determine that a symptom
of gender dysphoria is what actually meets the objective standard. This
is where court interpretation of medical diagnoses and conditions
ultimately differ. A medical professional would characterize what causes
the illness to be a medical need rather than the symptoms the illness
causes.
To analogize further, suppose an inmate has a brain tumor that causes
piercing headaches. The headaches are just a result of the serious
medical need-the brain tumor. Even if the inmate does not have
headaches, she still has the brain tumor. Would the inmate still have a
serious medical need for treatment? In both instances, it is necessary to
address the underlying serious medical condition. Thus, jurisdictions
that focus on gender dysphoria's physical manifestations severely limit
redress for inmates with gender dysphoria who do not display drastic
symptoms of suicide or self-harm.
2. Subjective Prong: The "Deliberate Indifference" Oxymoron. Next, to satisfy the subjective prong, a transgender inmate must
show that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference towards
the treatment of the inmate's gender dysphoria."' "[D]eliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

127. Id. at 525-26.
128. Id. at 526 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
129. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-35.
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unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment."' Furthermore, such indifference can manifest itself
through prison medical staff's response to the inmate's needs or by
prison officials "intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care
13
or intentionally interfering with the treatment once proscribed."n
Courts, however, should afford wide deference to the prison officials "in
the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the
officials have exaggerated their response" to the prisoners claims.3 2
To prove a deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that: (1) the
prison officials were subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm; (2) the
prison officials disregarded that risk; and (3) the prison officials' conduct
was more than negligence. 3 3 Circumstantial evidence may be used to
demonstrate deliberate indifference to medical needs when the facts
sufficiently indicate that a prison official actually knew of the harm."'
The wrongness of the conduct at issue must be apparent in light of
preexisting law; however, there is no requirement that the conduct itself
be previously held to be culpable.'
The Eighth Amendment requires that the level of medical care be
constitutionally adequate in relation to the inmate's serious medical
needs.18 6 The Supreme Court delineated this principle in Estelle v.
Gamble:
An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs;
if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. In the worst
cases, such a failure may actually produce physical "torture or a
lingering death," the evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of
the Amendment. In less serious cases, denial of medical care may
result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose . . . . We therefore conclude that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," proscribed by the Eight
Amendment.13

To determine whether medical care is constitutionally adequate, courts
are guided by prevailing medical standards. As referenced in Part II, the

130. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
131. Id. at 104-05.
132. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974),
133. Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015).
134. Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003).
135. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740-41 (2002).
136. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-06; Kothmann, 558 F. App'x at 910; De'LontaII, 708 F.3d
at 525-26; Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830-31 (7th Cir. 2007).
137. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (citations omitted).
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WPATH Standards of Care are recognized as the controlling recommendations for the treatment of persons with gender dysphoria.m' The
American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and WPATH insist that transgender inmates have access to
transition-related healthcare.'"' Consequently, a prison's "failure to
provide diagnostic care and medical treatment known to be necessary is
deliberate indifference."

40

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently
affirmed the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss a transgender
inmate's § 1983 claim in Kothmann v. Rosario.14' Reading the facts in
the plaintiffs complaint to be true, the court held that a transgender
inmate sufficiently alleged that the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference.' 4 2 The plaintiff, a thirty-eight year old transgender man,
was assigned to an all-female correctional facility. The plaintiff's
biological sex was female, but he lived as a male throughout his adult
life. Prior to his incarceration, he was diagnosed with gender dysphoria
and received medical treatment, including masculinizing hormone
therapy, a hysterectomy, an oophorectomy, and a double mastectomy.143

The defendant, Chief Health Officer of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC), had the autonomy to approve or deny medical care,
referrals, and consultation requests. As Chief Health Officer, she also
was responsible for supervising the other medical staff to ensure that
adequate medical care was provided to the inmates. Upon arriving at
the correctional facility, the plaintiff advised the prison medical staff of
his previous gender dysphoria diagnosis, his transition-related medical
care, and he requested hormone therapy. While imprisoned, he did not
receive any treatment for his gender dysphoria; in fact the only medical
treatment he received was for bipolar disorder.'44
The Eleventh Circuit held that based on the facts alleged, the plaintiff
established the deliberate indifference prong because: (1) the defendant,
FDOC Chief Health Officer, knew hormone treatment was the medically
recognized and medically necessary treatment for the inmate's gender
dysphoria; (2) at the time of the plaintiffs incarceration, the defendant

138. Supra Part I.
139. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 206; Report of the APA Task Force on Gender
Identity and Gender Variance, Supra note 31, at 42; Report of the APA Task Force on
Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder, Supra note 62, at 30.
140. H.C. v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 1986).
141. 558 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2014).
142. Id. at 912.
143. Id. at 907-09.
144. Id. at 907-08, 909.
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was put on notice of his gender dysphoria diagnosis, his medical history,
and serious medical need for continued hormone therapy; and (3) despite
this, the defendant knowingly refused to provide the inmate with
medically necessary hormone therapy for his gender dysphoria.
B. State Freeze Frame Policies and Blanket Prohibitionsagainst
Gender Dysphoria Treatment are Arbitrary, and, thus, Unconstitutional
Similar to the WPATH Standards of Care, constitutionally adequate
medical care must be "based on an individualized assessment of an
inmate's medical needs in light of relevant medical considerations."'"
Accordingly, prison officials are not entitled to summary judgment when
a reasonable jury could find that prison officials denied medically
acceptable and necessary treatment to an inmate because it conflicted
with a prison policy.147 Prison policies that preclude individualized
medical care, in turn, violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment." Numerous
courts have struck down blanket prohibitions against gender dysphoria
related medical care and therapeutic treatment.1 4 9
Thirty-six year old transgender inmate Ashley Diamond, who is
referenced in Part I, recently brought suit against the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) in Diamond v. Owens.so In her complaint,
Ms. Diamond alleges that prison officials in four separate Georgia

145. Id. at 911.
146. Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 242 (D. Mass. 2012); see Coleman et al.,
supra note 51.
147. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2014).
148. See, e.g., id. at 1068-71 (holding a prison policy that categorically denied cataract
surgery to all inmates who had at least one "good eye" violated the Eighth Amendment);
Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 861-63 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding a prison policy that premised
treatment for Hepatitis C on administrative factors including an inmate's expected length
of incarceration violated the Eighth Amendment).
149. See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (striking down as
facially unconstitutional a that state law that barred prison officials from providing
hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery to inmates with gender dysphoria); De'Lonta
I, 330 F.3d at 634-35 (finding that a prisoner with gender dysphoria sufficiently alleged an
Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials who denied hormone therapy pursuant
to prison policy); Allard, 9 F. App'x at 795 (finding blanket rule proscribing hormone
therapy violates the Eighth Amendment); Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (holding prison
policy that bars certain medically necessary treatments for gender dysphoria violates the
Eighth Amendment); Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286 (D.N.H. 2003).
150. Complaint, Diamond, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189 (M.D. Ga. May 18,2015) (No.
5:15-CV-50), ECF No. 3, 1, 9, available at https//www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6
legacy files/downloads/case/complaint_2.pdf.
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prisons violated her constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment
by (1) failing to treat her for gender dysphoria and (2) failing to protect
her from numerous sexual assaults."' In particular, Ms. Diamond
challenges the facial constitutionality of GDOC's policy concerning
treatment for inmates with gender dysphoria.' 5 2
Prior to her incarceration, Ms. Diamond lived as a woman. While a
teenager, she was diagnosed with gender dysphoria after being
hospitalized for attempting suicide. Following her diagnosis, Ms.
Diamond began treatment with feminizing hormones, which she
continued to receive for seventeen years. Through her hormone therapy,
Ms. Diamond developed a feminine figure, breasts, a soft appearance, as
well as other secondary female sex characteristics. When she was
initially processed through the GDOC in March of 2012, she informed
the officers that she was a transgender woman diagnosed with gender
dysphoria, explained her history of medical care, and requested
continued hormone treatment. Despite this, the GDOC seized her
feminine clothing and undergarments and refused to supply Ms.
Diamond with hormone therapy. The complete termination of her
hormone therapy caused debilitating side effects. Ms. Diamond became
severely depressed, suicidal, and anxious. While under the "care" of the
GDOC, Ms. Diamond was repeatedly raped, she was sexually assaulted,
and on multiple occasions she attempted suicide, auto-castration, and
auto-penectomy.153
Although a GDOC psychologist, trained in the treatment of gender
dysphoria, recommended that it was medically necessary for Ms.
Diamond to resume hormone therapy, prison officials rejected his
recommendation, claiming it was against GDOC policy. Ms. Diamond
filed several grievances petitioning for treatment, including personally
contacting the warden of Rutledge State Prison." Within Ms. Diamond's letter to the warden, she inquired what treatment options GDOC
provided for gender dysphoria' 5
The warden responded to Ms.
Diamond's letter stating, "[W]e recognize that people come in with issues
like that you stated and we seek first to ensure their protection.

151. Id. at 4-6, 30-35.
152. Id. at 33.
153. Id. at 7-29.
154. Id.
155. Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Diamond, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189 (M.D.
Ga. Feb. 2, 2015) (No. 5:15-CV-50), ECF No. 2-5, Exhibit C, availableat https/www.spl
center.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy-files/downloads/case/pi-motion-supporting-mater
ials.pdf.
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However, the Departmentdoes not offer therapy for [gender dysphoria] at
this time. "156
GDOC's Standard Operating Procedure on the "Management of
Transsexuals" (Transgender SOP) prohibited the continuation of medical
treatment for gender dysphoria unless inmates were, first, identified as
transgender during intake and, second, showed a history of prior medical
treatment."' If an inmate met those two requirements, the policy
restricted medical care to "'maintenance' of the inmate's .. . transgender
status but [would] not move the medical or surgical treatment any
further along the continuum of transgender changes."' 8
Policies like the Transgender SOP have been coined "freeze-frame"
policies because the level of treatment transgender inmates can receive
in prison is "frozen" at whatever treatment level they received, or lack
thereof, upon entering prison. Consequently, if GDOC medical personnel
diagnosed an inmate with gender dysphoria, who had no previous
diagnosis, the Transgender SOP prevented the inmate from seeking any
treatment whatsoever. Likewise, if an inmate's only treatment outside
of the GDOC was counseling, the policy would limit all treatment beyond
the scope of counseling.5"'
On April 3, 2015, the United States Department of Justice filed a
Statement of Interest in response to Ms. Diamond's lawsuit.'6 0 Within
its statement, the Department of Justice declared the GDOC's Transgender SOP facially unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.'
Although it did not speak to the merits of Ms. Diamond's complaint, the
Department noted, "Two things are clear from the record in this case:
one, the generally accepted standards for treatment of gender dysphoria
require treatment decisions be individualized; and two, Ms. Diamond did
not receive individualized care." 6 2 While addressing the parallels
between freeze-frame policies and blanket prohibitions against all
treatment for gender dysphoria, the Department delineated that "both
types of policies strike an arbitrary line that preclude individualized

156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Ga. Dep't of Corrs., Standard Operating Procedure on the Management of
Transsexuals, Diamond, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2015) (No. 5:15CV-50), ECF No. 2-5, available at https://www.spcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_1egacyfiles/downloads/case/pi motion supporting-materials.pdf.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Statement of Interest of the United States, Diamond, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
122189 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 03, 2015) (No. 5:15-CV-50), ECF No. 29, availableat http/www.
justice.gov/file/387296/download.
161. Id. at 2.
162. Id. at 11.
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medical evaluations and proscribe physician[s'] ability to provide
appropriate care."163
The Department of Justice stated that it was "reminding" state
departments of corrections that they have a constitutional duty to
provide treatment for gender dysphoria, just as they are obligated to
treat all other medical conditions.'" In a Department of Justice press
release, Acting Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta of the Civil
Rights Division stated:
Prisoners with gender dysphoria should not be forced to suffer
needlessly during their incarceration simply because they were not
receiving care, or could not prove they were receiving care, in the
community. Freeze-frame policies can have serious consequences to the
health and well-being of transgender prisoners, who are among the
most vulnerable populations incarcerated in our nation's prisons and
jails.165
The Department of Justice spoke, and the GDOC listened. On April 7,
2015, a mere four days after the statement of interest was filed, the
GDOC rescinded its freeze-frame policy. In its place, GDOC created a
new SOP entitled "Management and Treatment of Offenders Diagnosed
with Gender Dysphoria" (Gender Dysphoria SOP)." The new policy
provides that all offenders who may have gender dysphoria will be
assessed and evaluated by properly qualified medical and mental health
professionals. Furthermore, the Gender Dysphoria SOP specifically
states that "[tihe development of the treatment plan is not solely
dependent on services provided or the offender's life experiences prior to
incarceration .... Current, accepted standards of care will be used as
a reference for developing the treatment plan."'6 7 As a result, Ms.

163. Id. at 16.
164. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Files Brief to Address Health
Care for Prisoners Suffering from Gender Dysphoria (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov
/opalpr/justice-department-files-brief-address-health-care-prisoners-suffering-genderdysphoria.
165. Id.
166. Standard Operating Procedure: Management and Treatment of Offenders
Diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria, GA. DEP'T OF CORRS., https://assets.document
cloud.org/documents/1815018/managment-and-treatment-of-offenders-diagnosed.pdf.
167. Id. The new procedures for GDOC's Gender Dysphoria policy in its entirety are
as follows:
Offenders with a possible diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria, including offenders who
assert they have Gender Dysphoria, will receive thorough medical and mental
health evaluations from appropriately licensed and qualified medical and mental
health professionals. The evaluation will include an assessment of the offender's
treatment and life experiences prior to incarceration as well as experiences during
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Diamond was entitled to receive hormone therapy, but the rescission of
the freeze-frame policy did not address other arguments in her request
for a preliminary injunction.'
In June of 2015, Ms. Diamond was yet again sexually assaulted and
placed in solitary confinement."' On August 29, 2015, five days after
her attorneys made additional filings in support of Ms. Diamond's
motion for preliminary injunction, the GDOC abruptly decided to release
her from Augusta State Prison, even though she was not eligible for
parole until November 2015.170 According to Eleventh Circuit precedent, an inmate's release from incarceration renders all claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief moot."' Therefore, Ms. Diamond's
release prompted the court to declare her motion moot.1 7 2

incarceration (including hormone therapy, completed or in-process surgical
interventions, real life experience consistent with the offender's gender identity,
private expressions that conform to the preferred gender and counseling).
If a diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria is reached, a treatment plan will be developed
that promotes the physical and mental health of the patient. The development of
the treatment plan is not solely dependent on services provided or the offender's
life experiences prior to incarceration. Treatment plans will be reviewed regularly
and updated as necessary. Current, accepted standards of care will be used as a
reference for developing the treatment plan.
Each treatment plan or denial of treatment must be approved by the Statewide
Medical Director and Statewide Mental Health Director. Any hormone therapy
must be requested through the non-formulary review process.
In summary, offenders in the custody of the Department with a possible diagnosis
of Gender Dysphoria will receive a current individualized assessment and
evaluation. Treatment options will not be precluded solely due to level of services
received, or lack of services, prior to incarceration.
Id.
168. Diamond v. Owens, No. 5:15-CV-50, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189, at *4 (M.D.
Ga. Sept. 14, 2015); Transgender Inmate Ashley Diamond Released from Georgia Prison,
supra note 4.
169. Joint Status Report, Diamond, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189 (M.D. Ga. July 09,
2015) (No. 5:15-CV-50), ECF No. 58, available at https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/
fles/d6legacyfiles/downloads/case/joint-status-report-_150709.pdf; TransgenderInmate
Ashley Diamond Released from Georgia Prison, supra note 4.
170. TransgenderInmate Ashley Diamond Released from Georgia Prison, supra note
4.
171. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir. 1986).
172. See Diamond. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122189. at *4.
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V. EXPOSURE TO DANGEROUS SAFETY CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT:
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, EIGHTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT

It comes as no surprise that safety is an issue for transgender
inmates, especially when it comes to male-to-female (MTF) inmates
housed in male prisons. It has long been the practice in the United
States to incarcerate preoperative transgender inmates with prisoners
of their biological sex.173 MTF inmates who have not had genital
surgery are generally denied placement in women's institutions because
prison officials believe they would pose a threat to cisgender inmates."' As a result, MTF inmates are all too often the brunt of
harassment, humiliation, sexual assault, rape, and other violence.175
WPATH recommends that correctional institutions' housing, bathroom,
and shower facilities for transgender inmates "should take into account
their gender identity and role, physical status, dignity, and personal
safety. Placement in a single-sex housing unit, ward, or pod on the sole
basis of the appearance of the external genitalia may not be appropriate
and may place the individual at risk for victimization."'76 Although
some studies suggest placing transgender inmates in facilities consistent
with their gender identity, this solution also raises safety concerns."
For example, female-to-male (FTM) inmates would be seriously at risk
for sexual assaults, regardless of whether they had genital surgery. 7 1
While incarcerated, MTF inmates are very likely to be placed in
protective custody, otherwise known as solitary confinement; as a result,
they commonly are isolated from all recreational, educational, and
occupational opportunities. The majority of literature on the topic
concludes that solitary confinement does not provide "a satisfactory
solution because of the severe psychological stress associated with longterm isolation.""' As a result, transgender inmates, rather than their
attackers, are punished on sole basis of their victimization.

173. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829; Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered PrisonersCaught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 501 (2000).
174. Report of the APA Task Forceon Gender Identity and Gender Variance,supra note
31, at 42.
175. Id.
176. Coleman et al., supra note 51, at 207.
177. Report of the APA Task Force on GenderIdentity and Gender Variance, supra note
31, at 63.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 42.
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Equal Protection Claims

Many transgender inmates attempt to raise claims under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' However, such
claims are usually unsuccessful because the majority of courts have
found that transgender persons do not qualify as a suspect class for
equal protection purposes."s' The Equal Protection Clause is triggered
when persons who are similarly situated are treated differently.' 82
A plaintiff can establish an equal protection claim in one of two ways.
First, a claim can be stated by demonstrating that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of the
plaintiff's membership in a suspect class. 13 Under this equal protection theory, the plaintiff must establish that she is a member of a class
in which (1) is politically powerless; (2) has been historically discriminated against; (3) has an immutable characteristic; and (4) there is an
archaic and overbroad stereotype associated with the class. 1 84 If a
plaintiff cannot establish that she is a member of a suspect classification, she must turn to the second theory of equal protection. Under this
theory, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally treated
the plaintiff differently than other similarly situated individuals without
any rational basis for doing so."8 3
In Stevens v. Williams, 86 a preoperative transgender woman brought
an equal protection claim against the Oregon Department of Corrections
(ODOC). The plaintiff argued that her placement in a male correctional
facility denied her rights, privileges, protections, and immunities as a
female inmate.' Refusing to recognize transgender women as a
suspect class, the court applied both a rational basis test and middle
scrutiny.'" The court found that ODOC's practice of assigning prison-

180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
181. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2007);
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1997); James v. Ranch
Mart Hardware, 881 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D. Kan. 1995); Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 843296, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18959, *12 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985); Rush v. Johnson, 565 F.
Supp. 856, 868-69 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D. Minn.
1981); Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 145, 147 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
182. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
183. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973).
184. Id. at 28; Bowen v. Giliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642-43 (1975).
185. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 439-40.
186. No. 05-CV-1790-ST, 2008 WL 916991 (D. Or. Mar. 27, 2008).
187. Id. at *1.
188. Id. at *13.
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ers to facilities based on their anatomical sex was substantially related
to its interest in achieving prison security.'a In particular, the court
noted that "[p]reventing heterosexual crime[] is a legitimate penological
interest."' As a result, the transgender inmate's equal protection
claim was denied.19
Substantive Due Process Claims
There is no protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause for
inmates to be assigned to a specific institution or designated a particular
security classification.' 92 In Meachum v. Fano,'9 ' the Supreme Court
reasoned that "[t]he initial decision to assign the convict to a particular
institution is not subject to audit under the Due Process Clause,
although the degree of confinement in one prison may be quite different
from that in another."' 94 The Supreme Court has revisited similar
cases and its position has remained the same. In Vitek v. Jones,"' the
Court held that changes in the conditions of confinement that have a
substantial negative impact on the inmate are insufficient to invoke the
protections of the Due Process Clause.1 96 Likewise, in Hewitt v.
Helms,' the Supreme Court held that a prisoner has no liberty
interest in being confined in the general prison population rather than
in solitary confinement."' Consequently, prison officials need no
penological justification to transfer an inmate to more restrictive
quarters or less comfortable housing.'" The Court reasoned that "the
transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for
nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily
contemplated by a prison sentence."20 0
In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Powell v. Schriver,20' the plaintiff alleged that while she was
an inmate in the New York State Department of Corrections, a
correctional officer revealed she was a transsexual and that she had
B.

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).

193.

427 U.S. 215 (1976).

194.
195.
196.

Id. at 224.
445 U.S. 480 (1980).
Id. at 493.

197.

459 U.S. 460 (1983).

198.
199.
200.

Id. at 468-69.
Id.
Id. at 468.

201.

175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), thus violating her constitutional
right to privacy. Prior to her incarceration, the plaintiff underwent
numerous operations to transition into a female. While she was in the
custody of the New York State Department of Corrections, she tested
positive for HIV, "the virus that eventually causes Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome ('AIDS')."202
Not long after her diagnosis, a correctional officer disclosed that the
plaintiff had a sexual reassignment surgery and that she was HIV
positive in hearing distance of other inmates. Following this invasion of
confidentiality, the plaintiff became the subject of harassment by both
prison guards and prisoners. 203 The court addressed two issues: (1)
whether transsexuals have the right to confidentiality; and (2) if so,
whether the right to confidentiality exists in prison.204 As to the first
issue, the Second Circuit held that the Constitution protects "the right
to maintain the confidentiality of one's transsexualism."' Secondly,
the court held that transsexual inmates retain the right to confidentiality while incarcerated if there is no legitimate penological interest in the
disclosure.2 06
C.

Additional Eighth Amendment Violations

Unlike the analysis for failing to provide medical care, to determine
whether an inmate's conditions of confinement violate the Eighth
Amendment, courts must look to the totality of the conditions of
confinement.207 Even if no particular condition of confinement is
unconstitutional by itself, the cumulative effect of the prison conditions
potentially can expose inmates to cruel and unusual punishment.2 08
For example, if a transgender inmate presents evidence demonstrating
"a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, welldocumented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the
circumstances suggest" that the prison official being sued was "exposed
to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it,
then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find
that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk."20 9

202. Id. at 108-09.
203. Id. at 109.
204. Id. at 110-11.
205. Id. at 111.
206. Id. at 112-13.
207. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 362-63 (Brennan, J., concurring); Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 416.
208. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring).
209. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief for
Respondents).
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In Greene v. Bowles,21 0 the plaintiff-inmate was a preoperative
transgender woman who displayed feminine characteristics and features.
As a result of her appearance, she was placed in a protective unit to
prevent attacks from other inmates. However, an inmate with a long
history of violent assaults was also housed in the protective unit because
he testified against other prisoners. That inmate viciously beat and
attacked the transgender inmate on numerous occasions-one on which
he beat her with a mop handle and then hit her with a fifty-pound fire
extinguisher. The beatings were so severe that the attacker was charged
with attempted murder.21 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the transgender prisoner had the right to a trial
for her claim that the prison warden violated the Eighth Amendment by
knowingly placing her in a position to be physically assaulted by another
prisoner.212
D. Are the ProtectionsAfforded by the Prison Rape Elimination Act
Illusory?
The Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) was enacted in 2003 to
"provide for the analysis of the incidence and effects of prison rape in
Federal, State, and local institutions and to provide information,
resources, recommendations, and funding to protect individuals from
prison rape."2 1 ' PREA's National Standards are outlined in the Code
of Federal Regulations.21 4 The standards provide screening procedures
in addition to housing assignments. When deciding whether to place a
transgender inmate in a correctional facility for male or female
residents, the department of corrections must first "consider on a caseby-case basis whether a placement would ensure the [inmate's] health
and safety," and secondly consider "whether the placement would
present management or security problems.""'
Moreover, the screening procedures mandate that correctional facilities
seriously consider transgender inmates' own views concerning their
safety.2 16 In accordance with the WPATH Standards of Care, PREA
Standards require that transgender inmates have the opportunity to

210. 361 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2004).
211. Id. at 292-93.
212. Id. at 294-95.
213. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, H.R. 1707, S. 1435, 108th Cong. (2003)
(enacted).
214. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 115.5 to .501 (2015).
215. 28 C.F.R. § 115.242(c) (2015).
216. 28 C.F.R. § 115.242(d) (2015).
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shower separately from other inmates.217 In regard to housing placements, LGBTQ inmates must not be assigned to a particular unit, bed,
or other placement solely on the basis of their identification or status as
LGBTQ.21 8 Additionally, the placement and programming assignments
for all transgender inmates must be reassessed biannually to review
potential threats to the inmate's safety.21 While PREA's objective is
indeed a noble endeavor, transgender inmates' grievances under the Act
are rarely successful because Congress did not explicitly authorize
inmates to pursue a private cause of action under the Act.22 o However,
on September 24, 2015, a transgender inmate successfully challenged
Maryland's failure to comply with PREA, marking one of the first legal
victories for a transgender inmate under PREA.22 1
The plaintiff in the case, Neon "Sandy" Brown, is a preoperative
transgender woman. Upon her arrival at Patuxent Institution for a
mental evaluation, Ms. Brown was immediately separated from the other
inmates and strip searched by multiple officers. Subsequently, prison
officials assigned Ms. Brown to administrative segregation. This decision
did not have a valid penological justification; on the contrary, prior to
Ms. Brown's arrival, Patuxent officials conferred and decided to place her
in solitary confinement solely because of Ms. Brown's status as a
transgender woman. She remained in solitary confinement for a shocking
sixty-six days, for twenty-four hours each day. During that entire time
period, prison officials only permitted her one hour for recreation-that
is, merely one hour out of the 1584 total hours in which she was
confined.2 22 In addition to being punished for being transgender, the
guards routinely sexually harassed and insulted Ms. Brown. She stated,
"They didn't see me for the human being I am. They treated me like a

217. 28 C.F.R. § 115.342(g) (2015).
218. 28 C.F.R. § 115.342(c) (2015).
219. 28 C.F.R. § 115.342(e) (2015).
220. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609.
221. Brown v. Patuxent Inst., OAH No. DPSC-IGO-2V-14-33232, IGO No. 2014113
(Apr. 1, 2015), affd in part (Aug. 27, 2015); Press Release, FreeState Legal, FreeState
Legal Wins Groundbreaking Victory on Protections for Transgender People in Prison:
Marylandprisons will now have to ensure realprotections againstharassmentand violence
(Sept. 24, 2015), https//freestatelegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015 /09/Brown-Case-PressRelease-.pdf; Juliet Linderman, Judge: Maryland prison mistreated transgenderinmate,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 24, 2015, 9:51 AM), httpJ/bigstory.ap.orglarticle/a756eOe34dO5
4f72beedd9bl8258e936/judge-maryland-prison-mistreated-transgender-inmate; Zack Ford,
Judges Rules Against Jail Whose Staff Sexually HarassedTrans Inmate, THINK PROGRESS
(Sept. 24, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/09/24/3704839/transgenderprison-abuse-victory-prea/.
222. Brown, supra note 221, at *6-10; FreeState Legal Wins Groundbreaking Victory
on Protections for Transgender People in Prison, supra note 221.
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circus act." The guards watched her shower, told her she was
"disgusting," called her "it," and one guard even encouraged Ms. Brown
to commit suicide: "She told me that I should kill myself, that I'm - - I'm
not a woman, I would never be ....
On April 1, 2015, an administrative law judge found that Patuxent's
prison officials violated PREA by failing to have formal policies and
procedures in place regarding transgender inmates and "fail[ing] to train
all employees in how to effectively and professionally communicate with
transgender inmates." 2 25 The judge further found that (1) PREA
regulations were applicable to the administrative proceeding because
Maryland voluntarily agreed to be bound by the standards in exchange
for federal funding; and (2) the regulations were "designed to confer a
procedural benefit on an inmate." 226 Based on these findings, the judge
recommended that Ms. Brown receive $5000 in damages and that
Patuxent must institute PREA compliant policies and mandatory
employee training concerning transgender inmates.22 7 On September
24, 2015, the Secretary of the Maryland Division of Public Safety and
Correctional Services officially adopted the above recommendations,
thereby officially creating an individual cause of action through a
correctional facility's grievance procedure under PREA.22 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

The oppressive and discriminatory treatment of transgender inmates
needs to be acknowledged and addressed, not just within the criminal
justice system, but within society as a whole. Societal stigma isolates
many transgender and gender-nonconforming persons from participating
in society. As discussed above, the debilitating discrimination within the
housing, employment, education, and healthcare industries essentially
coerces many transgender women and men into incarceration. There is
no simple solution. No amount of political correctness will change the
reality that dominant culture treats and views transgender inmates as
second-class citizens. The day people stop having essentialist gendernormative opinions and beliefs may never come. However, the day will
come when the LGBTQ community and its allies' voices are

223. FreeState Legal Wins Groundbreaking Victory on Protections for Transgender
People in Prison, supra note 221.
224. Brown, supra note 221, at *26-27.
225. Id. at *25.
226. Id. at *12-13.
227. Id. at *33-34.
228. Order of the Secretary, Brown v. Patuxent Inst., OAH No. DPSC-IGO-2V-1433232, IGO No. 2014113, at *2 (Aug. 27, 2015).
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heard-voices like Ashley Diamond's: "Although the systematic abuse
and assaults I faced for more than three years have left me emotionally
and physically scarred, I'll continue to fight for justice and to shine a
light on the gross mistreatment of transgender inmates in Georgia and
22 9

nationwide. "

DANIELLE MATRICARDI
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